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Although the traditional theory of regulatory policy occupied the main position 
of the regulation in a long period, but the use of pure economic analysis method was 
proved by empirical analysis later to be incompatible with the true fact of regulatory 
policy. This paper tries to analyze regulatory policy on the political economy 
perspective through analyzing the political factors on the economic analysis basis.  
This paper takes the “market” concept into regulatory policy analysis, 
considering that the process of the regulatory policy is a political deal process, and 
the essence of regulatory policy is a political contract achieved by the political deal. 
The action that the various interest groups in the process fighting for their own 
interests will inevitably lead to transaction costs.  
The groups in the political market of regulatory policy achieve their own goals, 
interests and needs through formatting principal - agent relationships. Related to the 
principal, agents have more information superiority, coupled with the uncertainty of 
parties to a contract, so it is possible that agents in the policy process lead to the 
adverse selection and moral hazard. How to eliminate the adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems? Political economy analysis on regulatory policy brings in 
the idea of political balance, considering that the process of achieving the political 
balance will reduce the deviation of interests, reduce or even avoid the alienation of 
the role for an agent. In addition, political economy analysis on regulatory policy 
takes principal-agent model for further analysis, that relative to the regulatory 
agencies are passively by being regulated institutions captured this view, they mostly 
consider for their own departmental interests, itself constitute a Regulatory Capture 
supply, and the possibility of carrying becomes bigger, and the model of regulation 
capture becomes more real in this perspective.   
The “prisoners” problem in regulatory policy may lead to the failure of 
regulatory policy. Political economy analysis on regulatory policy tries to finding out 
the reforming measure through this series explores the negative effects of regulatory 














on regulatory policy opens the "black box" of the process of regulatory policy, and 
broadened the view of research on regulatory policy. This will perform a useful roll 
in the practice of regulatory reform in China, including theoretical progress and 
practice value. 
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